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Hoarders Only Discount
Consumables and Are More Patient
for Money
Brian D. Vickers, Stephanie D. Preston*, Richard Gonzalez and Andrea M. Angott†
Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA
Individuals with hoarding disorder (HD) excessively acquire and retain goods while
also exhibiting characteristics of impulsivity and addiction. However, HD individuals
do not always perform impulsively in experiments, they do not appear interested in
money, and they exhibit many features of risk-aversion and future-planning. To examine
impulsivity in HD, we compared validated community participants high and low in
hoarding tendencies on questionnaire measures of hoarding and impulsivity as well
as a standard experimental measure of impulsivity (intertemporal discounting) that was
modified to compare decisions about money, pens, and snacks. Common discounting
effects were replicated. Compared to the low hoarding group, the high hoarding group
was more impatient for consumables (pens and snacks) but they were more patient
for money. This increased patience for money in high hoarding individuals is in contrast
to all other studies on discounting in disordered populations, but consistent with the
phenomenology of HD. HD does not appear to be driven by a fundamental inability to
wait, but rather a specific, potent desire for consumable rewards.
Keywords: hoarding disorder, discounting, impulsivity, addiction, consumption
INTRODUCTION
Individuals with hoarding disorder (HD) are characterized by their excessive acquisition and
retention of goods with limited or no value, leading to signiﬁcantly cluttered living spaces that
cannot be used for their original purpose, and signiﬁcant associated distress and life impairment
(Frost and Hartl, 1996). HD now occupies its own diagnostic category in the DSM-V under
the OCD and related disorders section (American Psychological Association [APA], 2013), but
it is often comorbid with other impulsive–compulsive disorders, including OCD, compulsive
buying, gambling, and trichotillomania (Samuels et al., 2002; Frost et al., 2011), leading some to
characterize it as one of an extended family of compulsive–impulsive spectrum disorders (e.g.,
see McElroy et al., 1995). HD also shares many features with addiction, which is also considered
by many to be a disorder of impulsivity (reviewed in Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Perry and Carroll,
2008; Odum, 2011). Like addiction, HD involves prioritizing rewarding items over other important
life priorities like safety, shelter, and social relationships; it is associated with neural changes in
the mesolimbocortical system (reviewed in Wang et al., 2012); and it is diﬃcult to remit even
if there are some promising treatment options (Tolin et al., 2015). Thus, despite now occupying
its own diagnostic category, transdiagnostic approaches need to continue to understand the role
of impulsivity in HD (e.g., Tolin and Villavicencio, 2011; Rasmussen et al., 2013; Timpano et al.,
2013).
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There is empirical evidence that HD individuals are more
impulsive than comparison individuals (comparison groups
range across studies from typical community samples to
clinical groups with and without hoarding symptoms). However,
the evidence is more consistent when individual diﬀerences
measures are used than when experimental tasks are used. This
inconsistency likely reﬂects the fact that there are multiple,
distinct constructs associated with impulsivity including risk
seeking, present-focus, response inhibition, loss of control, and
delay discounting (see Perry and Carroll, 2008). HD individuals
scored more highly on multiple impulsive action and inattention
individual diﬀerence surveymeasures (Grisham et al., 2007; Tolin
and Villavicencio, 2011; Timpano et al., 2013). They were also
more impulsive on a signal detection task despite performing
the task more slowly (Grisham et al., 2007) and they had poorer
response inhibition on this task, but this appears to be because
the HD participants were older than the control participants
(Rasmussen et al., 2013). In one study, HD individuals preferred
the larger, more immediate reward on the Iowa Gambling Task
(Lawrence et al., 2006), but they performed like controls in two
other studies using the same task (Grisham et al., 2007; Tolin
and Villavicencio, 2011). Thus, evidence for impulsivity in HD
is more questionable to date for experimental data, and research
has yet to compare HD individuals to controls on a common
experimental measure of impulsivity in behavioral economics—
the intertemporal discounting task (ITD).
Beyond experimental inconsistencies linking HD to
impulsivity, multiple facts question the assumption that
HD individuals do have a domain-general problem with
impulsivity. HD individuals do not impulsively acquire or
keep money and, in fact, they use money especially frugally
to obtain goods (Samuels et al., 2008; Frost et al., 2009).
The documented paranoid personality traits in HD and their
excessive fear of events like home break-ins (Samuels et al.,
2008), as well as their indecision and perfectionism (Frost and
Gross, 1993), are also characteristics that are more associated
with risk-aversion and a future-focus that is unlike that
associated with addiction or trait impulsivity (Loewenstein
et al., 2001). The goal of hoarding behavior per se can also be
construed as fundamentally risk-avoidant and future-oriented,
as individuals acquire and protect resources that they think
they may need later (Frost and Hartl, 1996)—much like the
way food-storing animals create, maintain, and protect hoards
of food to prepare for future scarcities (Preston and Jacobs,
2001, 2005; Preston, 2013). The hoarding in HD also results
in signiﬁcant interpersonal conﬂict, discomfort, and diﬃculty
using living spaces (Frost et al., 2000), which could be construed
as a short term pain that is being suﬀered in order to provide
a long-term beneﬁt or protection from risk—again unlike
impulsivity. Thus, from a global perspective, hoarding behavior
actually bears many hallmarks of extreme patience, at least
regarding the ultimate goal of the behavior. HD individuals
may simply report fears about future needs to mask an
irrational impulse to acquire; however, it is also possible that
their impulsiveness is a proximate mechanism by which HD
individuals achieve a genuine, ultimate goal to provide for the
future.
Taken together, impulsiveness in HD needs to be examined
empirically, across domains, particularly using the standard,
accepted laboratory task for measuring impulsivity in the
addiction literature—the ITD. On a typical ITD trial, participants
are asked to make a forced choice between accepting a smaller
quantity of a reward sooner (e.g., $5 today) vs. a larger quantity of
the reward later (e.g., $12 in a month). The exact quantities of the
reward sooner vs. later and the precise latency that participants
have to wait for each option are systematically altered over many
otherwise identical trials so that a “discounting rate” can be
calculated per person, over time, representing the degree to which
they are susceptible to prefer a smaller amount when delivered
sooner—the operationalization of impulsivity.
The current study compared individuals with high and low
hoarding tendencies on their intertemporal discounting for
goods, food, and money. Most hoarding studies only examine the
degree to which individuals acquire or fail to discard material
goods; however, we included food because we were interested
in the degree to which hoarding reﬂects an evolved, adaptive
food-storing instinct shared with other species (Preston, 2013).
We also included money not only because it is the typical
unit of reward for ITD tasks in behavioral economics, but also
because we hypothesized that high hoarding participants would
not be uniformly impulsive, based on anecdotal reports and
case studies suggesting that HD individuals are not interested
in money per se. It is also useful for the large ITD literature to
realize that not all individuals are highly motivated by money,
which is almost always the only reward provided or compared
in behavioral economic studies. Based on our evolutionary view
and the phenomenological reports of HD, we predicted that high
hoarding individuals would be impulsive for goods and food
(pens and snacks), but not money.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
In order to ensure a broad distribution of hoarding tendencies,
participants were recruited using two diﬀerent advertisements
for a decision making study, one that speciﬁcally asked for
participants who would consider themselves “packrats” and
another that did not specify. Of the 38 participants, 27 were
community members of any adult age who were compensated
$10 for participation (16 high hoarding from the packrat
advertisement and 11 low hoarding from the unspeciﬁed
advertisement). The remaining 11 participants were recruited
and compensated with course credit through the university
psychology pool (three high hoarding, eight low hoarding). All
participants were female, which is common in HD studies (e.g.,
Frost and Gross, 1993) and practical, given a strong bias for
females to respond to community advertisements looking for
“packrats” (hereafter referred to as the “high hoarding” group
when not discussing the advertisement itself).
This was a study of individual diﬀerences rather than
the clinical diagnostic category of HD. As such, participants
were not given an oﬃcial clinical interview or diagnosis and
they are not referred to here as hoarders or individuals
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 March 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 30
Vickers et al. Discounting in Hoarders
with HD. Instead, we placed participants into high and low
hoarding groups based on their response to the advertisements
and a validated clinical instrument with high speciﬁcity
and sensitivity for detecting hoarding with scores >14 on
the Hoarding Rating Scale (HRS) (Tolin et al., 2010). The
HRS is typically administered in a clinical setting using an
interview format, but we have adapted it into an easy-to-
administer self-report questionnaire that reliably demonstrates
individual diﬀerences in the non-clinical population, which also
correlate with other individual diﬀerence measures that are
commonly elevated in HD and with a longer published, validated
hoarding questionnaires [i.e., the Savings Inventory-Revised (SI-
R); Frost et al., 2004] (see, Wang et al., 2012). To ensure a
clear distinction between low and high hoarding participants,
rather than just split participants by the advertisement they
responded to or whether their HRS scores were above or
below of 14, we allowed participants to be placed into the
high hoarding group regardless of which advertisement they
responded to if they had an HRS scores > 19 (median = 27.00,
mean = 26.74, SD = 4.96; n = 19, mean age = 35.05,
SD = 17.42) and we allowed participants to be placed
into the low hoarding group, regardless of which ad they
responded to, if they had an HRS score < 13 (median = 4.00,
mean = 4.53, SD = 4.03; n = 19, mean age = 48.21,
SD = 15.20). Participants with HRS scores between 13 and
19 were excluded. The two groups did diﬀer statistically in
age, t(36) = 2.48, p = 0.018, η2p = 0.146, but in the
direction opposite to the predicted confound, as usually HD
individuals are older but our high hoarding individuals were
younger than our low hoarding individuals. Age was used
as a factor in analysis (below) and did not inﬂuence the
results. High and low hoarding participants did not diﬀer
statistically on income, based on results from the Happiness
Spending Inventory (Dunn et al., 2008) that we administered for
another study completed by the same participants, t(36) = 1.04,
p = 0.306.
Participants were consented and tested individually in the
laboratory using MediaLab (Jarvis, 2006) on a Dell desktop PC.
All participants were consented and debriefed in writing and in
person; all procedures were approved by the Institutional Review
Board of the University of Michigan.
Intertemporal Discounting Task
The ITD task used in this study consisted of three blocks (order
randomized) of intertemporal choices about money, pens, or
snacks. Units were equilibrated across domains as money was
listed in whole dollars and pen and snack choices were worth
approximately one dollar each. Participants selected their favorite
pen or snack from an array, and all choices thereafter used their
chosen item to ensure task interest (e.g., Easy Touch or Precise
Gel pens; M&M or Oreo snacks). Each block consisted of 45
choices between a smaller reward (x1) sooner (t1) or a larger
reward (x2) later (t2) (see Table 1). Reward quantities (0–85) and
delays (now to 135 days from now) varied across trials.
Before each block participants would select their most
preferred stimulus for that domain (e.g., Easy Touch vs. Precise
Gel pens in the pen domain). Then, each trial would show
them a choice between a smaller amount of their selected item
sooner or a larger amount of that same item later, such as 3
Easy Touch pens today or 12 Easy Touch pens in 19 days. The
task was self-paced including the length of the break between
each of the three blocks. The task within each domain included
nine trials used in a prior ITD study of addiction (Kirby
et al., 1999), plus 36 more trials that we added to measure
responses to smaller and larger quantities and shorter and longer
delays than was previously included (described in full below),
and to systematically investigate diﬀerent aspects of the choice
attributes. This led to a total of 135 trials for each participant.
Additional trial types were included to expand upon results
in four ways. A set of trials at small x1, x2 values was included
to test whether discounting eﬀects are present even for relatively
small amounts. Another set of trials systematically varied time
and quantity to more precisely estimate how changes in time and
quantity inﬂuence choice. The ﬁnal two types of trials investigated
whether high or low hoarding participants were more likely to
violate assumptions of typical discounting models. Exponential
discounting assumes a steadily decreasing likelihood of choosing
the larger later (LL) option as the time to acquire it increases
at a rate proportional to 11+t , where t is time. Power utility is
based on the fact that people value increasing amounts less (i.e.,
diminishing utility); power utility requires that if amounts are
both multiplied by a constant, then choices should not change
(see Table 2 for a summary of the speciﬁc trials). Because the
present study used amounts in three diﬀerent domains (money,
pens, snacks) it is important to distinguish whether patterns of
choice are due to changes in the utility of the amount or to
changes in the discounting of time. Diﬀerent discounting patterns
could arise when comparing, say, choices for money and choices
for pens, not because participants discount time diﬀerentially
in those two domains but because they value increments in
the amounts diﬀerentially. The ability to separate utility from
discounting comes from our design where we systematically
manipulate elements of the amounts and time in each trial.
Psychopathological Symptoms
After the ITD, participants completed psychopathology
inventories that could be correlated with diﬀerences in
impulsivity emerging from the task, including the HRS,
SI-R, Obsessive Compulsive Inventory-Revised (OCI-R; Foa
et al., 2002), Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS; Patton and Stanford,
1995), Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck et al., 1988a), and Beck
Depression Inventory II (BDI; Beck et al., 1988b). All survey
measures were administered after the ITD task to avoid priming
participants with issues related to their psychopathology before
the task.
Analysis
To assess overall discounting, the more impulsive, SS responses
were recoded as 0 and the more patient, LL responses were
recoded as 1. Results are presented in terms of the proportion
of LL choices, representing the degree of patience or willingness
to wait longer for the larger reward. But as is common in the
behavioral economics literature, any time a participant or group
is referred to as having a higher or steeper discount rate, that
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TABLE 1 | Trials in the Intertemporal Discounting Task (ITD), sorted by trial type.
Options Analysis Subsection
Trial type x1 t1 x2 t2 Increasing the
later reward
Increasing the
reward and delay
Exponential
discounting
Power utility
function
Small quantities, now or later
1 0 2 16 1
1 0 4 16 1
1 0 6 16 1
1 0 8 16 1
1 0 10 16 1
0 0 1 7
3 0 12 19
5 0 8 7
10 0 30 40
Moderate quantities, now or later
14 0 25 4 1
19 0 25 38 2
24 0 35 14 3
27 0 50 6 4
34 0 50 15 5
40 0 55 47 6
41 0 75 5 7
54 0 80 15 8
55 0 75 46 9
Moderate quantities, now or later (original Kirby items)
14 0 25 19 1
19 0 25 53 2 1
24 0 35 29 3
27 0 50 21 4 3
34 0 50 30 5
40 0 55 62 6
41 0 75 20 7
54 0 80 30 8
55 0 75 61 9 2
Moderate quantities, now or much later
14 0 25 79 1
19 0 25 113 2
24 0 35 89 3
27 0 50 81 4
34 0 50 90 5
40 0 55 122 6
41 0 75 80 7
54 0 80 90 8
55 0 75 121 9
Larger quantities, all delayed
44 32 60 93 1
55 32 75 93 2 1
66 32 90 93 1
32 28 44 90 2
48 28 66 90 2
19 20 25 73 1
27 15 50 36 3
40 28 55 29
69 44 85 135
Options denoted as in the text with x1 representing the smaller amount, t1 the sooner time, x2 the larger amount, and t2 the later time; all choices were presented as
pairs of (x1, t1 vs. x2, t2). Original Kirby items were taken from Kirby et al. (1999). Trials with very small quantities offered now or after a delay were added to their set as
were trials that offered their moderate reward amounts with a smaller or a larger delay than they used. New items were added to test specific functional forms and to
separate delay from amount. The separate subsections of analysis are presented in the final four columns, with numbers depicting which trials (rows) were relevant for
that comparison.
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TABLE 2 | Subcategories of trials added to examine different attributes of discounting.
Variables
Subcategory Trials Manipulated Fixed Test
Later reward 5 x2 x1, t1, t2 Increasing later reward from small x2
Delay and moderate reward
amounts
27 t2 t1; x1, x2 Increasing longer delay
Adding a constant
to Time
6 t1, t2 x1, x2 Increasing time by the same amount for
both ts; Exponential discounting
Multiplying amounts by
constant
5 x1, x2 t1, t2 Increasing amount by the same amount
for both xs; power utility
Each subcategory is listed below with the number of trials per domain, which variables were manipulated vs. held constant, and the attribute of interest. x1, smaller
amount, x2, larger amount, t1, sooner time, t2, later time.
means that they value the more patient LL option less in favor
of the more impulsive SS option.
All contrasts used the following model except where noted:
a logistic curve was ﬁt using a logistic hierarchical linear model
(HLM) including ﬁxed factors for group (low hoarding = 0; high
hoarding = 1), domain (money, pen, snack), their interaction,
and a random factor for each participant’s intercept. Planned
contrasts compared discounting money vs. consumables (pens
and snacks together) (2, −1, −1) and pens vs. snacks (0, 1, −1).
All discounting results remained after separately controlling for
age or participant population (community vs. psychology pool),
but a few small shifts in result thresholds are noted below under
individual diﬀerence correlations.
RESULTS
Analyses are organized by comparing overall discounting rates
ﬁrst, followed by the speciﬁc tests for the degree to which choices
were inﬂuenced by delay and quantity, followed by tests to
examine behavioral consistency with both exponential and power
law forms of discounting (deﬁned below).
Overall Discounting
Overall rates of discounting were not diﬀerent in the two
groups, χ2(1) = 1.35, p = 0.25, but they did diﬀer by
domain, χ2(2) = 7.97, p = 0.021, and the two interacted,
χ2(2) = 105.76, p < 0.001. Money was discounted less than
consumables overall, odds ratio (OR) = 1.10, z = 2.76,
p = 0.006, and the diﬀerence in discounting money compared
to pens and snacks was 61% larger in high hoarding than
low hoarding participants, money vs. consumables contrast by
group: OR = 1.61, z = 10.17, p < 0.001. This interaction was
due to high hoarding individuals discounting pens and snacks
more steeply than low hoarders and money less steeply than
low hoarders, and low hoarders discounting all three domains
at similar levels. The contrast between pens and snacks was
also marginally larger in high than low hoarders, OR = 0.86,
z = −1.78, p = 0.075, with high hoarders responding more
impulsively for pens than for snacks, OR = 0.85, z = −2.81,
p = 0.005, and low hoarders again treating them similarly,
OR = 0.98, z = −0.35, p = 0.729 (see Figure 1A). These main
eﬀects and interactions were consistent across the subsets of
trial types reported below and so are not re-presented in each
subsection.
Effect of the Later Reward Amount with
a Fixed Early Reward and Delay
This subset of trials examined the eﬀect on choice of increasing
the larger amount (x2 = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10) while ﬁxing the
smaller amount (x1 = 1) and ﬁxing the delay periods
(t1 = 0, t2 = 16 days). The logistic HLM with a centered
x2 parameter found that people generally waited longer as
the amounts increased, x2 eﬀect: OR = 1.33, z = 4.95,
p < 0.001, and this eﬀect did not diﬀer between high and
low hoarding individuals, OR = 1.03, z = 0.37, p = 0.711. As
with the overall discounting eﬀects above, as later quantities
increased people were still more patient for money than for
consumables, domain eﬀect: χ2(2) = 7.30, p = 0.026; money
vs. consumables: OR = 1.24, z = 2.00, p = 0.046, and
waited marginally longer for more pens than for more snacks,
OR = 0.71, z = −1.86, p = 0.063. At these low reward values,
there was no omnibus group diﬀerence between money and
consumables, group by money vs. consumables: OR = 1.22,
z = 1.29, p = 0.196, but high hoarding individuals were
more impulsive for snacks than pens while low hoarding
individuals were more impulsive for pens than snacks, group
by pens vs. snacks: OR = 2.13, z = 2.97, p = 0.003.
These slopes across values of x2 did not signiﬁcantly interact
by domain and group, x2 by domain by group interaction,
χ2(2) = 0.70, p = 0.704. Thus, small and increasing quantities
of the larger, later reward (holding the three terms x1, t1,
and t2 ﬁxed) reveals no diﬀerence in impulsivity for money
compared to consumables as x2 increases, and at these small
amounts high hoarding individuals actually wait longer to
acquire more pens than snacks compared to controls (see
Figure 1B).
Effect of the Delay and Moderate Reward
Amounts with a Fixed Initial Time (Now)
A second subset of trials compared choices between nine original
trials (Kirby et al., 1999) to two identical types that varied t2
to be earlier or later than the original one. The initial time
was ﬁxed to deliver immediate reward (t1 = 0), and the early
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FIGURE 1 | Intertemporal discounting responses by group (high hoarding vs. low hoarding individuals) and domain (money, pens, snacks). Percent of
participants choosing the larger-later (LL) option overall (A); effects of the increasing later reward amount with a fixed early reward and delay (B); effects of adding a
constant to both times (C); effects of a constant multiplier (D). In all plots, choices for money are represented with green coloration, pens in blue, and snacks in
orange. For (B), low hoarding individuals are represented by solid lines and high hoarding individuals are represented by dashed lines. For (C,D), the number of times
participants made consistent SS choices are in the lighter shade and the number of times participants made consistent LL choices are in the darker shade.
and later reward were moderately sized and ﬁxed within sets
of three choices (e.g., x1 = 24, x2 = 35) (see Table 1). HLM
analyses compared the eﬀect of the delay within sets of three
trials (original t2, earlier t2, later t2) and the eﬀect of the total
amount of reward across the nine sets of three trials. A parameter
was added to the HLM for t2, ordering each of the nine triplets
by their mean x1, x2 amounts to assess quantity eﬀects with a
centered linear “quantity contrast.” This analysis complements
the previous one by changing which variable was manipulated
while leaving the others constant. Previously we only varied the
second quantity and this time we only varied the length of the
larger delay interval while holding the other three parameters
ﬁxed.
As the t2 delay increased, participants generally became
increasingly impatient for money compared to consumables, t2
by money vs. consumables: OR = 0.99, z = −4.47, p < 0.001,
and more impatient for pens than snacks, t2 by domain omnibus:
χ2(2) = 26.85, p < 0.001; t2 by pens vs. snacks: OR = 0.994,
z = −2.54, p = 0.011. But looking separately at each group,
only low hoarding individuals showed this increasing impatience
with longer delays for money and pens, t2 by group by domain:
χ2(2) = 11.77, p = 0.003; t2 by domain in high hoarding
individuals: χ2(2) = 0.37, p = 0.831; t2 by domain in low
hoarding individuals: χ2(2) = 27.03, p < 0.001; t2 by money
vs. consumables in low hoarding individuals: OR = 0.993,
z = −4.48, p < 0.001; t2 by pen vs. snack in low hoarding
individuals: OR = 0.994, z = −2.55, p = 0.011. There were
no eﬀects of the amount of moderate reward or any other
eﬀects in this model, χ2s < 2.55, ps > 0.115 (see Figure 2).
Therefore, low hoarding individuals had high discount rates for
money compared to consumables (i.e., would only choose LL
after short delays for money) but high hoarding individuals had
similar discount rates for both money and consumables as t2
increases.
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FIGURE 2 | Intertemporal discounting responses for effects of delay and moderate reward amounts with a fixed initial time (now). The percent of
participants choosing the LL option overall split by smaller-sooner (x1) and larger-later (x2) reward amounts, which are listed above plots. Choices for money are
represented with green lines, pens in blue, and snacks in orange. Low hoarding individuals are represented by solid lines and high hoarding individuals are
represented by dashed lines.
Effects of Adding a Constant to Both
Times: Testing Exponential Discounting
Theories of exponential discounting hold that people’s
discounting rates decline exponentially as time increases,
and the rate of discounting only depends on the diﬀerence
in time between the two points. Exponential discounting
assumes that with ﬁxed quantities, delaying both t1 and t2 by
the same constant will not alter choices. To assess the ﬁt of
exponential curves, crosstabs were created in the form (x1, t1
vs. x2, t2) compared to (x1, t1 + k vs. x2, t2 + k), where k is a
constant.
The number of preference reversals were summed over the
three trial pairs (i.e., 0, 1, 2, or 3 preference reversals) and
compared with a Poisson HLM, but this time using the number
of preference reversals as the dependent variable. The original
trials involved moderate reward amounts (19–75 items) oﬀered
immediately (0 days) or after a moderate to large delay (21–
93 days), and to these trials a corresponding constant of 15,
20, or 32 days was added to both the early and the later
option.
Overall, choices were consistent across groups and domains,
χ2(1)s < 0.348, ps > 0.50. Within each domain, there was
also no diﬀerence in the number of consistent compared
to inconsistent choices between the low and high hoarding
groups, zs < 0.20, ps > 0.60. In line with the high hoarding
group’s general consummatory impulsiveness, high hoarding
individuals predominantly made consistently impulsive choices
for pens and snacks (about eight times more often SS–
SS than LL–LL) but chose more often to be consistently
patient for money (50% more LL–LL than SS–SS). The low
hoarding individuals, instead, were biased to be somewhat
impulsive for all three domains, choosing SS–SS about 50%
more often than LL–LL for pens, snacks, and money (see
Table 3; Figure 1C). Thus, both low and high hoarding
groups were consistent with assumptions of exponential
discounting, but high hoarding individuals had many more
SS–SS consistent choices for pens and snacks compared to low
hoarding individuals, as was the case in the overall discounting
rates.
Effects of Multiplying a Constant by Both
Amounts: Testing the Power Utility
Function
The power utility function can produce eﬀects that may
be similar to discounting. If people have diﬀerent utilities
for, say, money and pens, then we may incorrectly attribute
the diﬀerence to discounting rather than utility. Power
utility assumes that when both times in the same trial
are multiplied by a constant, k, the preferences will not
change.
We compared trials that were identical except for a constant k
multiplier that was applied to both smaller (x1) and larger (x2)
reward amounts; e.g., (x1, t1 vs. x2, t2) compared to (k • x1,
t1 vs. k • x2, t2). These trials all involved larger quantities
of items in both smaller and larger positions (i.e., from 32
to 90) oﬀered at two delays that were both displaced in time
and never immediate (32 vs. 93 days or 29 vs. 90 days). This
set of trials included one pair and one triplet. The trial pair
used k = 1.38 with x1, x2 pairs of (32, 44) and (48, 66). The
triplet used k = 1.36 with x1, x2 pairs of (44, 60), (55, 75),
and (66, 90). Again, the Poisson test was used to compare
the number of preference reversals for each domain (0, 1,
2, or 3 of the possible 3 reversals from SS to LL or from
LL to SS). Supporting the power utility function, choices on
these trials were consistent in both low and high hoarding
groups, across domains, χ2(1) < 1.96, ps > 0.373. Within each
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TABLE 3 | Cross-tabulations by group and domain for tests of exponential discounting, with a constant added to both times with (x1, t1 vs. x2, t2)
compared to (x1, t1 + k vs. x2, t2+k).
Low hoarding individuals, money High hoarding individuals, money
(x1, t1 + k) vs. (x2, t2 + k) (x1, t1 + k) vs. (x2, t2 + k)
(x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL (x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL
SS 30 4 SS 19 5
LL 1 22 LL 4 29
Low hoarding individuals, pens High hoarding individuals, pens
(x1, t1 + k) vs. (x2, t2 + k) (x1, t1 + k) vs. (x2, t2 + k)
(x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL (x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL
SS 31 3 SS 43 9
LL 4 19 LL 2 3
Low hoarding individuals, snacks High hoarding individuals, snacks
(x1, t1 + k) vs. (x2, t2 + k) (x1, t1 + k) vs. (x2, t2 + k)
(x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL (x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL
SS 27 7 SS 34 10
LL 3 20 LL 6 7
Each 2 × 2 Table is based on three trials per participant (each 2 × 2 table has 57 entries).
TABLE 4 | Cross-tabulations by group and domain for tests of the power utility function, with a constant added to both amounts with (x1, t1 vs. x2, t2)
compared to (k • x1, t1 vs. k • x2, t2).
Low hoarding individuals, money High hoarding individuals, money
(k • x1,t1) vs. (k • x2,t2) (k • x1,t1) vs. (k • x2,t2)
(x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL (x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL
SS 14 0 SS 9 2
LL 0 5 LL 1 7
Low hoarding individuals, pens High hoarding individuals, pens
(k • x1,t1) vs. (k • x2,t2) (k • x1,t1) vs. (k • x2,t2)
(x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL (x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL
SS 14 0 SS 18 0
LL 0 5 LL 1 0
Low hoarding individuals, snacks High hoarding individuals, snacks
(k • x1,t1) vs. (k • x2,t2) (k • x1,t1) vs. (k • x2,t2)
(x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL (x1, t1) vs. (x2, t2) SS LL
SS 10 4 SS 15 0
LL 0 5 LL 0 4
Consistent preferences are demonstrated by higher values in SS/SS and LL/LL cells (diagonals in quadrants one and three), indicating that participants decided similarly
in the original decision and the k shifted version. This trial type included one pair and one triplet but to avoid overlapping choices from the triplet only the pair is presented
here.
domain, there was also no diﬀerence in the number of preference
reversals between low and high hoarding groups, zs < |1.20|,
ps > 0.250. The nature of the consistent choices in this set of
trials was similar to that of the prior section, with high hoarding
individuals being overwhelmingly, consistently impatient for
pens and snacks (SS–SS, with actually no LL–LL choices for
high hoarding individuals deciding about pens), but more often
consistently patient for money. Conversely, the low hoarding
group was biased to be consistent in all three domains by being
two to three times more impatient than patient (see Table 4;
Figure 1D).
Individual Differences Measures
As a complementary analysis to the group-level analysis
above, we also investigated whether continuous, individual-
level variation in the degree to which participants exhibited
hoarding, impulsivity, and psychopathological tendencies
correlated with their main outcome variable from the
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discounting analysis reported above. For each person we
correlated their individual diﬀerence data across all of the
scales with the degree to which they were more patient
for money than consumables by subtracting their pooled
LL choices for both pens and snacks from their percent of
LL choices for money. This produced a variable ranging
from +1 (100% choices for money and 0% choices for pens
and snacks) to −1 (0% choices for money and 100% LL
choices for pens and snacks), with the zero point representing
similar proportions for money and consumables. Consistent
with the group-level eﬀects above—where high hoarding
individuals were more patient for money than consumables—
this behavior was also signiﬁcantly correlated with the
continuous, individual diﬀerence measures across the whole
sample including all hoarding scales (HRS, SI-R Clutter,
SI-R Diﬃculty Discarding, SI-R Acquisition, OCI-R
Hoarding), rs(36) > 0.33, ps ≤ 0.05, η2ps > 0.10, and
the BIS Attentional Impulsivity subscale, r(36) = 0.40,
p = 0.012, η2p = 0.16 (see Table 5). Even after controlling
for age and population (community vs. or psychology
pool) all results remained except that scores from the pre-
screening administration of the HRS became marginal
in both cases and the correlations with SI-R acquisition
dropped to the marginal level, ts(35) > 1.77, ps < 0.09,
η2p s> 0.08.
DISCUSSION
Using a modiﬁed version of a standard impulsivity task
from behavioral economics, we found reliable evidence
across multiple measures and analysis strategies that people
with problematic hoarding tendencies are actually more
patient than people with low hoarding tendencies for
money, but they are indeed less patient for consumable
goods, particularly pens. The high hoarding group’s greater
patience for money suggests that they do not have a
domain-general problem with impulsivity as has been
suggested for addiction (e.g., Odum, 2011), and that they
do possess the cognitive capacity to save or wait for larger
reward.
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst time a disordered
population has demonstrated greater patience for money
compared to controls, or to have shown discounting rates
for money that are inversely correlated with discounting
for consumable rewards. Extensive prior research ﬁnds that
impaired populations—including those addicted to heroin,
cocaine, alcohol, cigarettes, food and gambling—discount
their drug of choice more steeply than money while also
discounting moneymore steeply than controls, even compared to
ex-users (see reviews in Bickel and Marsch, 2001; Perry and
Carroll, 2008). The fact that drugs are usually discounted
more steeply than money is attributed to the more direct
impact of consumables on the biological reward system, with
many studies ﬁnding greater discounting for consumables
like food, candy, or beer compared to money, even in non-
disordered populations (Odum and Rainaud, 2003; Odum
et al., 2006; Estle et al., 2007). We replicated this overall
eﬀect of greater discounting for consumables, but also found
that participants with low tendencies to hoard treated the
three domains more similarly to one another. However,
the group with high hoarding tendencies discounted money
less steeply and discounted consumables more steeply than
controls. Thus, domain-speciﬁc discounting rates may be
more powerful in populations with a focused desire. This
diﬀerential treatment of money by individuals with high
hoarding tendencies does accord with their real-world apparent
lack of interest in making and accumulating money and
their frugal use of it to obtain desired goods (Frost et al.,
2009).
Our results also suggest that the delay impacts choice more
than the quantity, particularly for rewards that are oﬀered
“now.” The participants with high hoarding tendencies were
particularly prone to impulsively obtain pens—even more so
than snacks—again attesting to their domain-speciﬁc interest
in goods per se. This is particularly interesting in light of
prior studies across domains that presumed that drugs of
abuse and food are discounted more steeply than money
because they can be consumed (and, thus, activate the biological
reward system more strongly). For the participants with high
hoarding tendencies, pens are their desired item of choice and
they appear to strongly drive the choice system despite not
being literal consummatory reward. However, paradoxically,
the individuals with high hoarding tendencies did prefer a
single snack delivered immediately over more snacks delivered
later while being willing to wait for a delay from now to
accumulate more than one pen; they also generally preferred
multiple pens immediately over more pens later. Such reversals
perhaps make sense if you either consider that only single
snacks can be consumed immediately (and thus have a greater
appeal to people with hoarding tendencies only in cases when
t1 = 0) or if wanting to accumulate material goods takes a
non-linear function that eventually curves downward, whereby
more pens is better but there are limits to how many you
could need or how many in the short term could satisfy the
desire. Regardless, these complexities attest to the need for
future ITD work to include a broad range of relevant units
and delays to capture important biologically-relevant stages
of the process and units of interest (see also Odum et al.,
2006).
The particular impatience of high hoarding individuals for
immediate consumables suggests that the “incentive salience”
(cf., Berridge and Robinson, 2003) of goods is what makes
the items diﬃcult for these people to resist (see an overview
of the biological mechanisms for cross-domain reward in
Preston et al., 2014). Similarly, in a prior study, neural activity
in the nucleus accumbens—the region associated with the
motivation to acquire rewarding drugs—increased during the
acquisition of goods to the extent that participants reported
real-world problems with hoarding (Wang et al., 2012). This
rewarding property of goods for people with HD, but not
for money, has been underappreciated—with most theories
focusing on their indecision or fear of making mistakes
(e.g., see Frost and Hartl, 1996). Perhaps fear can potentiate
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TABLE 5 | Correlations of psychopathology measures with the main effect
of the intertemporal discounting task (ITD).
% LL Difference
Money – Snack and Pen
Scale r p
Hoarding scales
HRS pre-screen 0.33 0.04∗
HRS post 0.37 0.02∗
SIR clutter 0.35 0.03∗
SIR difficulty discarding 0.39 0.02∗
SIR acquire 0.36 0.03∗
OCI-R hoarding 0.36 0.03∗
Non-hoarding psychopathology scales
BAI 0.13 0.44
BDI 0.27 0.10t
STAIT 0.13 0.44
Impulsivity subscales
BIS attention 0.40 0.01∗
BIS motor 0.15 0.38
BIS non-planning 0.16 0.35
High hoarding individuals discounted money less and consumables (pens and
snacks) more than low hoarding individuals, so individual differences measures
were correlated with the difference score of the % larger-later (LL) decisions for
money minus pens and snacks. All correlations have df= 36. HRS, Hoarding Rating
Scale. SIR, Savings Inventory Revised. OCI-R, Obsessive Compulsive Inventory,
Revised. BAI, Beck Anxiety Inventory. BDI, Beck Depression Inventory. BIS,
Behavioral Impulsivity Scale. STAIT, State Trait Anxiety Inventory, State. ∗p < 0.05,
tp < 0.10.
a proximate motivation toward goods to alleviate future
uncertainty, to provide comfort in the absence of rewarding
social bonds, or to provide literal, physical protection (Preston,
2013).
Multiple facts suggest that our task and results are valid.
Unlike in some other experimental tests of HD and impulsivity,
we did not ﬁnd null eﬀects and we replicated most standard
discounting eﬀects, including greater patience for increasing later
reward and greater impatience for immediate, early reward and
for consumables over money. We also replicated our results from
the two group comparison of high vs. low hoarding individuals
with continuously-varying individual diﬀerence correlations
across the whole sample; these correlations also replicate a
prior study that found greater attentional impulsivity in HD
(Tolin and Villavicencio, 2011). Our results also remained
similar after controlling for age and recruitment method
(community or psychology pool). Moreover, our results aﬃrmed
the assumptions of exponential discounting and the power
utility function, particularly in low hoarding participants. The
individuals with high hoarding tendencies did tend to be
consistent for consumables when a constant was added to both
delays (which does not violate exponential discounting), but
only because they preferred smaller amounts of pens or snacks
oﬀered immediately while preferring the larger quantity when
the two time periods were shifted away from “now,” which is
consistent with the known potency of immediately available
reward.
In addition to replicating many common ﬁndings in the
delay discounting literature, our task and trial design used an
enhanced version of a standard set of delay discounting items
(Kirby et al., 1999) with items that allowed us to test for speciﬁc
forms of discounting. For instance, exponential discounting
requires that if a person chooses (x1, t1) over (x2, t2) then
they should choose (x1, t1 + k) over (x2, t2 + k). Evidence
of preference reversals across such a pair rejects exponential
discounting without requiring that we estimate parameter values
(see Krantz et al., 1971, for an explanation of this approach).
This approach allows us to determine whether exponential
discounting holds across money, pens, and snacks, and whether
it holds equally in the two groups. We opted not to perform
non-linear parameter estimation because it would be diﬃcult
to compare across three domains. For example, if we ﬁt a
hyperbolic discounting function and observed diﬀerences across
the three domains in the discounting parameter, we would
not be able to determine whether the diﬀerent parameters
actually resulted from diﬀerences in discounting across the
domains or from a confounding diﬀerence in utility (e.g.,
because a pack of cookies really isn’t worth an exact dollar
or means something diﬀerent when you have 5 packs or
35 packs compared to 1). The approach adopted in this
study tailored the trial types to study diﬀerent aspects of the
decision while making fewer assumptions about the domains
and using statistically powered but simple tests that allow us
to compare groups and domains. A more careful simultaneous
assessment of discounting vs. utility functions across domains
is beyond the scope of this project, but should also be
investigated.
Despite the novelty and consistency of our results, there
are some limitations. Our choices were not incentivized with
real rewards and our high hoarding group was identiﬁed
through self-report, which was followed up with a validated
clinical questionnaire rather than a structured clinical interview.
However, ITD procedures are known to produce similar results
whether the rewards are hypothetical or real (Johnson and Bickel,
2002; Madden et al., 2003) and hoarding should be thought of
as a continuously varying individual diﬀerence and not just a
present or absent psychopathology (reviewed in Preston et al.,
2009; Preston, 2013). One must also not assume that greater
attentional impulsivity and ITD discounting for goods should
be extended to other forms of impulsivity that we did not
measure, or other aspects of HD such as discarding problems.
In clinical samples up to 60% of hoarding patients meet the
criteria for compulsive buying (e.g., Frost et al., 2002), so it is
possible that this impulsiveness for consumable reward explains
the compulsive buying and acquisition of free items in HD, but
we need to determine empirically which if any other forms of
impulsiveness are disordered in HD. A large, systematic study
that compares all forms of impulsivity within participants and
across groups and domains is still needed.
A trans-diagnostic, symptom-based approach to HD
that generously includes both empirically validated tasks
and individual diﬀerence measures can help us understand
the underlying problems that promote HD. This approach
can also help us understand the potential link between
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HD and other related phenomena like impulse-control
disorders and addiction, which is currently poorly understood
and likely prevents us from being maximally eﬀective in
treating HD.
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